Philosophy, Law, and the Palestinian Question: The Fragility of Justice in Genocide Prevention
- Umar Majeed
- Jul 17
- 42 min read
Abstract:
This essay aims to discuss the ongoing use of force in Gaza by Israel following October 7th 2023, where Palestinian resistance troops penetrated the colonial borders with force, from the vantage points of International Law and Philosophy. Two mechanisms will be utilised to provide an insight into this incident: the Just War Theory and the crime of Genocide. The overarching argument presented is that the framework of genocide works accurately as a theoretical mechanism, but the barrier which prevents it from being practically effective is a post-colonial consciousness which is enmeshed within the International Legal System due to philosophical reasons. It will be argued that an alternative is required where the current system suffers from a Bystander Syndrome through inaction, particularly in genocide prevention. Therefore, in order for radical resolution, a Leviathan is required which acts as an independent, politically different mechanism to establish justice through the Rule of Law.
This essay utilises an empirical and historical methodology, using real time and historical evidence to prove the premises postulated. This research is unique and important because it offers an insight into a major world event from the remits of both Philosophy and International Law which has not been effectively done before, especially given the current climate in Gaza. As such, it serves to expose a major flaw in the International System and a possible alternative.
Contents Page (Click to Navigate Sections):
1: The Crossroads between International Law and Western Philosophy
1.1 Introduction:
This essay will discuss the international mechanisms designed to respond to the use of force, and whether such mechanisms are consistently applied. This is especially relevant in the current climate, given the situation unfolding in Palestine, more specifically in the Gaza Strip. Since a military offensive by Palestinian armed forces on October 7th 2023, Israel has launched an unprecedented attack ranging from missiles, drone attacks and heavy artillery bombardment on the inhabitants of Gaza. Following this, I have been confounded by the Bystander Syndrome suffered by the collective International Community, who are armed with rhetorical gestures instead of a bona fide reaction.
Philosophy is relevant for this study because it serves to identify the root causes of any given action; dealing with the remit of thought and intent. International Law is relevant because it serves to show how such thought translates into action. This research hopes to draw the crossroads between intent and action through these two disciplines.
1.2 The Dark History of Western Philosophy:
If one were to peruse through the archives of Western philosophy, footprints of a polarity between Western civilisation and the Other would be found scattered throughout history. The terminology used to express this difference changes, but the concept remains; from the ‘Barbarian’ and the ‘Greek’ in the Hellenistic Period, to the ‘Uncivilised’ and the ‘Civilised’ in the Renaissance Period and finally the ‘Terrorist’ and the ‘Free World’ in the Contemporary Period; there is a constant distinction between the West and the Other, where the latter is deemed as inferior. The overarching argument to be made is that it is because of a survival of this colonial dichotomy of the Orient and the Other that we are currently faced with silence from the International Community (IC) in the case of Palestine. Two examples will suffice from key thinkers, namely Francisco De Vitoria and Immanuel Kant to portray how deep this philosophical dichotomy truly runs in Western thought.
Francisco De Vitoria’s Predicament:
Vitoria is seen as the father of global political philosophy and of international legal thought: as such, if we were to attempt to find the dichotomy of the Orient/Other within the history of Western thought, this would be an appropriate place to begin with.
Through his revivification of Jus Gentium and his encounter with the ‘Indians’, Vitoria tackles the issue of who belongs within the category of Sovereign Nations. After contemplation, he decides that whilst ‘the Indians’ may have the capacity to act as sovereigns, they are not: whilst they are ‘possessing a universal reason’, they are ultimately ‘backward, barbaric and uncivilised’ and as such ‘it is precisely whatever denotes the Indian to be different’ which results in ‘justifying war’ for the purpose of ‘effacing Indian identity and replacing it with the universal identity of the Spanish’. In essence, the ontological fact of being culturally different to the Orient Occident meant that such people were uncivil. This in turn justified waging war against them, thus stripping away any autonomy that they may possess as a sovereign people.
Immanuel Kant’s Phobia:
Kant took this dichotomy two steps further as the philosopher who contributed the most to the framework in which the IC currently operates. He justified going to war on the basis of the mere existence of a people who ‘lack a legal civil state’. The Kantian imperative of destroying those who threaten Western civilisation through their mere existence can be seen at its best as racism and at its worse; the blueprint of genocide.
Not only were those who were ‘uncivilised’ deserving of being confronted with a colonial subjugation, but they acted as a threat to civilised nations and as such war should be waged against them to neutralise the threat that comes about from their mere existence. This phobia describes the philosophical doctorhood of what genocide requires: the Dolus Specialis, which is the radical intent of destroying a particular group because they belong to that group. This clearly demonstrates the philosophical Otherness subjugated to other peoples through two key thinkers in Western thought.
One would hope that the formulation of the United Nations and the structure of postmodernism ensured that such a history was behind us and to judge other peoples by the metrics of their race and culture is itself a barbaric concept. Yet, this has been found not to be the case. This eurocentric bias has amounted to both positive actions and omissions which contradict the Rule of Law, even through the medium of a ‘peace making entity’ such as the United Nations. This is most explicitly portrayed in the case of Palestine.
1.3 Within the Remnants: International Law and Palestine:
In order to encapsulate the disparity between what the Law says in comparison to what it does, depending on the involved parties, an important framework that I found was coined by Dr Ardi Imseis who distinguished between the Rule By Law and Rule of Law. The former is the practice of Realpolitik, where power makes the Law and ‘Might Makes Right’. The latter is the famous coinage found enshrined as a principle of Law, as popularised by Dicey in the 19th century, designed to ensure that justice remains at the forefront of any exchanges of power.
The Rule By/Of Law distinction serves as an important portrayal of how power is used to exploit the Other. Moreover, it indicates how the civilisational imperative of peace and self determination exists only so long as the status quo of the IC, entrenched within a colonial legacy can retain its hegemonic status. Anything which jeopardises this control is to be removed even if it contradicts the Law, thus serving as Rule By Law.
In fact, Imseis conceptualised the distinction between ‘Rule By Law' and ‘Rule of Law’ based upon the way in which the United Nations regenerated the same concepts of racism with mere semantic differences. He argues that this is most clearly epitomised in the Palestinian struggle, which is supported by Goldberg through his concept of ‘racial Palestinianisation’: the Barbarian and the Greek are lost in antiquity but the Hostis Humani Generis remains through armed resistance against colonialism.
Before delving into the relationship between the settler colonists and the indigenous people within Palestine, we must first examine the situation regarding the Law promulgated by the IC in the past, regarding Palestine. To establish a correlation between the history of the IC in Palestine and the current dilemma, such motions must be judged either as an adherence to the Rule of Law through establishing Justice and consistency or the Rule by Law through Realpolitik.
The argument that will be made is twofold: that the actions of the IC from the Balfour Declaration to the current day enforced a racial Palestinianisation, where the indigenous population of Palestine were treated as ‘Lesser’ both through legal edicts and Realpolitik. Secondly, that the Palestinians were treated with what Imseis has described as ‘legal subalternity’ where their status as the Other has impinged their legal rights. Therefore, this history is what has led to a ‘Bystander Syndrome’ in the current context, with no real action to prevent what may be a genocide.
In regards to the history of Palestine, three clear examples of legal objects serve as a bolstering of the Other complex, insinuating a Rule By Law tactic, reinvigorating the colonial project.
1. The Balfour Declaration:
The first is the Balfour Declaration itself which was issued to Lord Rothschild in 1917 serving to offer the services of the United Kingdom to establish a ‘national home for Jewish people’ in Palestine. This acted as Realpolitik: the declaration acted as another eurocentric exploitation of the Other, through upholding a British mandate which began in 1920, not yet creating a monotonous sovereign state where one already existed.
It seems that the Empire faced a similar predicament to Vitoria with the Indians. Should the Palestinians be included in the Jus Gentium, or the modern equivalent of the IC? The Declaration proved that they would not be included because of cultural differences which removed them from the class of sovereignty.
2. The Peel Commission:
This anthropological distinction, where peoples are designated to be collectively different which bolsters or diminishes their status in the hierarchy of States, was further demonstrated through the Peel Commission of 1936. This occurred near the end of the British Mandate and was designed to examine tensions that were boiling between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine. Goldberg has described the report as bolstering ‘racial antagonism’ between the two parties, where the Jews were described as ‘a highly intelligent and enterprising race backed by large financial resources’ and the Arabs were ‘a comparatively poor, indigenous community, on a different cultural level’.
3. The United Nations’ Idea:
In 1947, the United Nations created Israel; an idea that was born out of the philosophical imperative that the Palestinians were the Other. As such they were lesser, uncivilised and ultimately undeserving of Statehood. This meant that Israel could be created: justified through a philosophical proclivity to imperial progress in the face of the Other who was merely there to do the bidding of the IC. If the Palestinians were to disobey and resist, they would be deemed as Hostis Humani Generis and if that were the case, the Kantian Imperative of destruction in the face of mere existence of ‘Otherness’ was justified.
However, pretences must be maintained and the Rule of Law had to be portrayed as the face of the IC, even though the idea was discreetly engineered through the Rule By Law. In order to give this action of colonial expansion a sense of legality, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 181 in 1947, which ceded half of the land of Palestine to this newly founded entity named Israel without any Palestinian representative. It has been postulated that the Resolution was ‘a continued international rule by law inherited’ from the past and as such, ‘helped reify Palestine’s international legal subalternity in the newly formed UN system’.
Moreover, within the Travaux Preparatoires of Resolution 181, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) had certain members who seemed to ‘shed all pretence of impartiality.’ An example of this was the Guatemalan representative whose statement to the General Assembly was described as ‘racist and colonial’ stating that ‘the intransigent attitude of their leaders is the only obstacle to the attainment of liberty’. Liberty for whom? Certainly not for the Palestinians who were to be displaced from their homes as half of their country were to be conquered.
Yet the most blatant contradiction to democracy and the Rule of Law was shown through the repercussions of this idea. Could democratic rights be bestowed upon all citizens, where the newly founded Israel would have most of its constituents belonging to the subaltern Palestinian community? Further, how would the significant legal issue of the contradicting international principles (of Israeli sovereignty and Palestinian self determination) be balanced? This issue was attempted to be resolved by the first Prime Minister of Israel, Gurion, who suggested that there is an ‘overriding right’ of Israeli hegemony in the region: Palestinian democratic abilities and the right to self determination could only ever be considered when ‘Jews are in the majority’.
Overall, this demonstrates how in the history of International thought there was a general endorsement of the ‘Other’ as being ‘Lesser’ and as such, Realpolitik may be subjugated upon them. Just as modern International Law was constructed due to a confrontation with the colonial encounter, the Fons Et Origo of Israel was a colonial project reflecting the power of Western hegemony as an instantiation of Rule By Law. The Palestine case acts as a particular example which epitomises the dark reality of colonialism. The legal subalternity reinforced through these examples proves why there is a Bystander Syndrome from the IC when it comes to speaking out against Israeli actions against the Palestinians both prior and post October 7th: such inaction has been embedded within the consciousness of the IC. From a philosophical perspective, Roth has described inaction as ‘complicity’ in such crimes. Moreover, this dichotomy does not only accommodate for a deep racism, but according to Bernasconi, ‘a culture of genocide’.
The next section will attempt to apply this philosophical dichotomy of the Other into the case study of October 7th through the concept of Just War and the legal right for a State to resort to violence.
2: The Concept of ‘Israeli force as Just War’:
2.1 The Use of Force in light of International Harmony:
The Just War Theory is a concept which attempts to justify the use of force in exceptional circumstances. In International Law, there are two frameworks within the theory. The first is the Jus Ad Bellum, which establishes the legality of a State going to war in the first place. The second is the Jus In Bellum which examines whether the actions within the war were legal or not. For the purposes of our study, the Jus Ad Bellum will be relevant, which is reflected in the concept of Self Defence in International Law, with very few additions to this to allow a State to wage war against another, none of which are relevant for this study.
After October 7th 2023, countless States adamantly expressed the inherent right of Israel to defend itself. This was an attempt to provide legality to the Jus Ad Bellum, where the reason to go to war through Operation Swords of Iron (OSOI) was Self Defence,
The legal concept of Self Defence has been embedded within International Law, primarily through Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In this, it states ‘nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.’
The Holistic Factual Matrix:
It would be inappropriate to take the actions of Hamas on October 7th in isolation of 70 years of settler colonialism by Israel. This was emphasised by Pappe, who stated that any legal judgement made regarding the Palestinian predicament must be done by ‘locating Israel’s barbaric actions in Gaza within a wider historical context’.
In order to understand whether or not Israel exercised an inherent right to self defence, two factors must be considered. The first is the nature of Self Defence and whether OSIO was in accordance with such a nature. The second is examining whether the required conditions for the exercise of Self Defence were met.
The concept of ‘armed attack’ in Article 51 must be delineated to understand the nature of Self Defence. This was explained in the landmark case of Nicaragua v. United States (1986), where it was described as ‘the most grave forms of the use of force’, such as ‘cross border attacks by regular armed forces’. This portrays how the nature of Self Defence is a defensive response where the Fons Et Origo of the violence was the other party.
However, Israel has been committing ‘armed attacks’, such as that described in Nicaragua, for decades against the Palestinians as illustrated in the Kafr Qasim massacre of 1956. It may be argued that the dated nature of this incident deems it irrelevant to the current discussion but my argument rests on the principle that the IC should examine the entire factual matrix precisely due to how old this situation spans. In this incident, Israeli forces indiscriminately opened fire on Palestinian villagers. Decades later, in 2007, Israeli President Peres formally apologised, acknowledging the attack as a crime. This demonstrates how Israel started the acts of violence, spanning from the 1956 Massacre and the systematic annexation of the West Bank to what has been described as an ‘apartheid system’ in Palestine. This makes the response one with a nature of Self Defence (carried out by Palestinians on October 7th) rather than the counter response (by Israel post October 7th). As such, the holistic factual matrix disqualifies OSOI from having a nature of Self Defence because its campaign was provocative rather than defensive in the wider context. However, the actions of the Palestinian forces could be characterised as sharing a defensive nature because they did not start the ‘armed attacks’.
Secondly, two conditions are enshrined within International Law for legal self defence, namely: necessity and proportionality. From the vantage point of the International Community post October 7th, there was an immediate discussion regarding these two conditions to justify Israel’s right to self defence, with a neglect of the holistic factual matrix and the nature of self defence.
These two conditions have been embedded into International Customary Law as demonstrated in the case of Nicaragua v. United States (ICJ, 1986), where the ICJ stated that ‘self-defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it.’ This position was subsequently reinforced in the case of Oil Platforms (Iran v. USA, ICJ, 2003).
Necessity entails all other options being exhausted before using force as a last resort; in this case, no such measures were taken in an attempt to end hostilities, instead a ‘revenge campaign’ began which does not correlate with the condition of necessity. Far from necessity, the OSOI campaign reflects the concept of ‘doing unto others as they would have done to us’, as stated by Hitler when justifying genocidal acts. However, Palestinian forces had met the criterion of necessity through years of attempting to diplomatically attain self determination.
Secondly, proportionality requires that the means used to exercise force do not exceed that which is required to neutralise the threat. Over 25,000 tons of explosives do not amount to proportionality; unless the target of Israel is beyond militants. Israeli motives were deduced by Human Rights group B’Tselem through their report ‘Revenge policy in motion; Israel committing war crimes in Gaza.’
However, the Palestinian forces used low scaled weapons which could not cause proportional damage to the 70 years of occupation. Moreover, where the threat is the IDF and American intervention, the Palestinian resistance did not even have the means to create a proportionate response. In contrast, the Israeli counter response led to the displacement of over 1 million Palestinians by January 2024, in the space of three months.
Therefore, the OSIO could not qualify as using a right to self defence under Article 51 because the operation did not have a defensive nature, nor did it meet the conditions required. However, could the Palestinian attack be considered as the exercising of a legal right to self defence?
There are two factors which will answer this question. The first is any legal instrument which permits Palestinian armed forces to resist the occupation through violence. The second is whether Palestine is a Member of the United Nations, which is a condition under Article 51.
1- Legal Instruments:
The first legal instrument to be considered is Resolution 2649 (XXV) of 1970, where the UN GA affirmed, ‘in the specific context of the peoples of Palestine… the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples under colonial rule… to restore themselves… by any means at their disposal’. This was elaborated on in Resolution 3070 (XXVIII) of 1973, where the GA clarified that any means at their disposal ‘included armed struggle’.
Moreover, such a sentiment supporting Palestinian resistance was reiterated by the ICJ Advisory Report in 2024 where Lord Charlesworth states that ‘under customary international law, the population in the occupied territory does not owe allegiance to the occupying power and is not precluded from using force in accordance with international law to resist the occupation’.
Therefore, from the perspective of the holistic factual matrix, Palestine, in attempting to gain self determination, has the right to exercise ‘armed struggle’ in attaining that goal. The resolutions could be relied upon as a basis for such actions, but they would not go as far as to justify illegal acts in the process. This was accounted for by Abu Marzouk who stated that:‘we have internal mechanisms for investigating and disciplining them’, where the command of the leading officials to the soldiers was to not harm innocent civilians.
However, it seems that one must go further to prove the Palestinian right to self defence as embodied in the UN Charter because it must be a Member of the United Nations.
2- UN Membership:
Since Palestine formally appealed to the IC through the PLO Declaration of Independence in 1988, 147 States have recognised its existence as a Sovereign State. However, the vast majority remain powerless because of the staunch rejection from the US and its allies. In 2011, Palestine applied for full membership of the United Nations and received great support but the US warned that it would use its Veto powers to reject such an action. Over a decade later in 2024, in the midst of OSOI, this appeal was repeated and again amounted to nothing. This demonstrates how the legal subalternity enforced through a racial palestinianisation has barred the Palestinians from a right to self defence. As such, any actions that they perpetrate with force cannot be excused under the Just War Theory through self defence and may be expelled as an act of terror from the Hostis Humani Generis. This is because resolutions such as those mentioned are not internationally binding and certainly do not hold as much authority as the UN Charter which is embedded within the fabric of the IC.
Therefore, the Palestinian attack on October 7th 2023 was one which had a nature of self defence, meeting the criterion of necessity and proportionality, hinging upon the concept of the holistic factual matrix but it was not legal self defence due to not being a Member of the UN. Resultingly, the response to October 7th carried out by Israel was not one of self defence because it was based upon 70 years of provocative action, which was building into an ‘incremental genocide’ through attacks, missile launches and an apartheid system. This means that such actions cannot be excused under Jus Ad Bellum because it was not self defence.
Ultimately, neither party met the legal definition of exercising Self Defence and thus the utilisation of Just War Theory collapses as a justification for any violence. However, the legal instruments which explicitly highlight the right to self determination through violence may be relied upon by Palestine as a legal justification through International Law if the Rule of Law stands.
2.2 Jus Ad/ In Bellum: An appropriate mechanism?
The framework presented in International Law to deal with force through the Jus Ad/In Bellum structure is insufficient in this particular circumstance. This was submitted by Milanovic, who stated that ‘the jus ad bellum is so complex, uncertain and contested as it applies to Israel and Gaza that it actually has very little useful to say.’ This is primarily because of its binary application where the framework is designed to deal with a conflict between two Sovereign States, on a relatively equal playing field. The question of Palestine is far more nuanced as demonstrated through the holistic factual matrix.
History Repeating Itself?
In fact, the current predicament is not the only time that the IC has attempted to remain within the confines of the Jus Ad/ In Bellum structure to deal with crimes of an international reach. During Post World War Two deliberations, there was a significant commotion regarding the method in which the Nazis should be held to account. The US Delegation stated that, ‘we have no basis of dealing with the atrocities… unless we have a war connection’. In essence, the ‘destruction of the rights of minorities’ would only become of ‘international concern’ if there was a violation of Jus Ad Bellum. History, therefore, acts as testament for an urgent requirement to use an alternative framework.
As such, the crime of genocide must be examined for the case of Gaza post October 7th. The final question which may arise regarding this examination is why Crimes Against Humanity as a category of crimes are not a sufficient mechanism of resolve. This is because the crime of genocide requires the element of Dolus Specialis, which is a special intent of destruction beyond the mere Mens Rea to commit the crime. It is held that such an intent was found in this situation because of the philosophical bearings and as such, the ‘scourge of humanity’ known as genocide must be unfolded.
3- Genocide as ‘The Scourge of Humanity’:
3.1 The Travaux Préparatoires of the Genocide Convention:
Genocide has existed as a concept for far longer than it has as a term with Sartre arguing that ‘the fact of genocide is as old as humanity itself’. It was coined by Raphael Lemkin amidst the aftermath of the Nazi Holocaust in his work ‘Axis Rule in Occupied Europe’, deriving from the Greek ‘genos’ (race) and the Latin suffix ‘cide’ (killing). For Lemkin, genocide accomplished two things: ‘first, to destroy the nationhood of the oppressed; second, to replace it with that of the oppressors’.
The term was referred to by the Nuremberg IMT Indictment and was subsequently utilised in positive International Law through General Assembly Resolution 96 (1) which acted as a non binding Resolution, defining genocide as a ‘denial of the right of existence of entire human groups’ and as something condemned by the ‘civilised world’ (discreetly reinforcing the colonial dichotomy of the Other). Finally, this led to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) which codified the definition of genocide. It stands till this day as the definitive internationally binding law, described as ‘the major forensic tool we have for dealing with genocide’.
There were a variety of mixed opinions from the International Community regarding the Genocide Convention when it was drafted. Scholars such as Robinson bleakly stated that ‘no amount of special pleading can disguise the fact that it will remain largely ineffective to achieve this purpose’ (of genocide prevention). Others reinforced the sentiment by stating that it ‘was to make no real advance’ and was methodologically ‘unrealistic and impracticable’. However, some scholars had taken a more extreme stance regarding the Convention, stating that it was an ‘insult to the intelligence’ and a ‘dangerous’ instrument.
Arguably, this is how the Convention remained for some years, only being used effectively after another European War, namely the Balkan Crisis of 1992. This demonstrates how the IC uses such a framework when it aligns with a eurocentric benefit, reflecting the enmeshed colonial dichotomy. Therefore, the effectiveness of the mechanism depends on which State requires its use and their place within the Jus Gentium.
I would argue that the Convention has progressed over time ‘through acts of interpretation and other related legal developments’. Elements of the Convention, such as the universal obligation to prevent, could originally have been described as a ‘morally pregnant but a normatively empty concept’, but an ‘empty concept should not be confused with a vacuous idea’. This is reflected through the obligation to prevent genocide being eventually reflected in legal structures such as Obligation Erga Omnes, which means that it is binding on all States, irrespective of their ratification of the Convention.
Moreover, I agree with Schabas who understood ‘the definition as it stands to be adequate and appropriate.’ This is because on a legalistic and inferential basis, the definition provided by the Convention is efficient and encompassing; however, the purpose of this study is to demonstrate that there is a wider deficiency in the IC, where the Law may act as a bona fide faculty, but the practical mechanism is flawed.
In essence, the legal ingredients for culpability of the crime of genocide are twofold: one of the five categories of Actus Reus as delineated in Article 2 of the Convention (with the targeting of a specific group alongside the Mens Rea) alongside the Dolus Specialis, which is the radical intent to destroy that particular group because it is that group. This is the reason why Philosophy plays such an important role in this study; to deconstruct the scenario and understand the intent behind the acts.
3.2 The Categories of Genocide:
According to Article 2, which has been described as ‘the heart of the Convention’s regime’, ‘genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such’. Namely, ‘(A) Killing members of the group, (B) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, (C) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, (D) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group and (E) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group’.
The five categories are exhaustive rather than indicative which means that no further acts may be considered as genocidal. This restrictive approach is a positive attribute of the nature of the Convention because it closes the floodgates and ensures that genocide is only legally utilised for the most severe crimes. Moreover, each category requires a Mens Rea, where for instance mass killing requires the intent of mass killing of a protected group (under the Convention).
The Protected Group:
The Convention clearly stipulates that the targeted group who is being attacked must fall under one of the following categories: a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such. The wording ‘as such’ is crucial because it demonstrates that it is because of the fact that the group shares one of the protected characteristics that they suffer from genocidal acts.
An example where a lack of belonging to a protected group meant that there was no genocide is the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Whilst Leo Kuper has argued that ‘the US destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, among other acts of strategic bombing constituted genocide’, the soundest position according to the Convention is that no genocide has occurred because there was no targeting of a protected group.
Moreover, in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro (ICJ, 2007), the ICJ held that there was a genocide because there was targeted attacks of a particular group which shared a protected characteristic, namely the Bosnian Muslims. This demonstrates that a required feature for a conviction of genocide is targeting a group from those that are considered as sharing the protected characteristics.
Whilst there has not been sufficient elaboration on what the protected characteristics entail by the Convention or the Rome Statute, other legal instruments may be used to develop an understanding. Some commentators of the Convention have broadly described a national group as one that ‘incorporates elements of a shared history, culture or language’. A racial group has often been described in International Law from a subjective vantage point based upon the fact that such a group can be ‘perceived as being different and possibly inferior by other groups on account of particular… traits’. An ethnic group has been described by the ICTR Trial Chamber as one whose members share ‘a common language or culture’ and may distinguish itself as such, or be distinguished by the perpetrator as such. Amnesty International has found the Palestinian people to be a distinct national, ethnic and racial group under Article 2 of the Genocide Convention, as is the position held in this work.
However, two approaches have arisen regarding how to define a group: the Objective approach which attempts to provide factual definitions and the Subjective Approach where the perpetrator may define whether a people were targeted for belonging to that group. The latter can be seen as problematic, where the culpable State can attempt to defend their actions by stating that they were targeting a particular political group, which is not a protected characteristic under the Convention. As such, this may provide room for a legal loophole to escape genocidal acts against a particular group. Therefore, the position that makes more sense, both from a logical and legal perspective, is the Objective approach.
The fact that the protected characteristics are closed off and cannot be extended further is a positive element of the Convention because it closes the floodgates. Additionally, other characteristics such as political groups were originally considered as sharing such a characteristic but it was held that political affiliations are not intrinsic to an individual’s way of life, unlike the other groups.
Category One: Killing Members of the Group:
The first category of Actus Reus is often seen as the most critical to qualify genocide as the ‘Crime of all crimes’, namely: killing members of the group. To establish genocide through this category, it requires the Actus Reus of mass killing and the Mens Rea of targeting a specific group sharing a special characteristic for such mass killing.
The litmus test of quantification serves as an important factor to prove the actus reus for the first category of genocidal acts, but the overall State policies that resulted in such acts are also pertinent. This is because Mens Rea for this first category is inferred from the holistic factual matrix of the attack. Whilst an increase in numbers of death does result in a higher probability of meeting the litmus test it is not definitive proof because the Mens Rea cannot be proven through acts alone.
In the case of Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić (ICTY, 2001) (the Srebrenica Genocide), the Court established that mass killing of a substantial nature can constitute the actus reus of genocide. Moreover, in the Guatemalan Genocide, approximately 50,000 indigenous Mayans were killed, which resulted in convictions for the crime of genocide. Such cases can act to provide an estimation as to the amount of mass killings resulting in conviction and, as such, meet the litmus test of quantification.
It has been argued that ‘quantification may not be an appropriate test’ where the issue of ‘numbers killed is mentioned nowhere in the 1948 Convention, so it would provide at best a secondary test, after the matter of specific intent and acts’. However, I hold that the litmus test of quantification allows for an inference of the Mens Rea and all that is required to establish the Actus Reus is placing the acts contextually within the holistic factual matrix to create a definitive proof. Moreover, the fact that it is not mentioned in the Convention can be due to the universality of genocide; though the crime is the same, the scenarios are often completely different. As such, the intent of causing mass killings for a particular group cannot be objectively quantified in the Convention because in one scenario there may be a population that is significantly smaller than another. For instance, the amount of mass killings in the Guatamelan Genocide do not need to be compared to the Holocaust carried out by the Nazis for both to share a genocidal nature.
The Mens Rea for mass killing can be proven from two factors: reasonable certainty and political incitement. Reasonable certainty is where a particular attack at a specific location will, beyond reasonable doubt, have the result of causing the mass killing of people who share that protected characteristic. Secondly, political incitement is regarding statements by leading officials of the accused State which encourage a perpetration of violence, or acts which will cause the mass killing within that group.
Application:
Regarding the category of mass killing in the case of Gaza, the Actus Reus of mass killing which can be inferred from the litmus test of quantification and the Mens Rea of targeting the Palestinian people in Gaza through mass killing, must be proven.
According to the Palestinian Ministry of Health, over 50,000 Palestinians have been killed since October 7th as an exacerbation of the state policy of Racial Palestinianisation that has been inculcated into the psyche of Israel since its inception. From the litmus test of quantification and previous cases such as the Guatamelon Genocide, this meets the Actus Reus of the first category.
Arguably, this is the most pertinent category from the first of the two elements of genocide on the basis of the Convention, because mass killing acts as the most extreme form of genocidal activity, with other categories further reinforcing the existence of such intent.
The Mens Rea for mass killing is proven from two factors: reasonable certainty and political incitement. Reasonable certainty is the factor of the habitual context of Gaza, where if such an attack was to occur it would beyond reasonable doubt serve to target all of the population that is resident there, beyond armed soldiers.
In Gaza, if one were to have the ‘use of explosive weapons with wide area effects, especially aerial bombs of 250 pounds (110kg) to 2,000 pounds (900kg), on residential buildings and in the proximity of hospitals in one of the world’s most densely populated areas’, ‘alongside a military tactic to deny essential humanitarian aid from a civilian ‘target group’, this would serve as genocidal intent to cause mass killings at the least, and at the most: wipe such a population from the face of the Earth.
Moreover, the statements of political incitement by leading Israeli officials reinforce such a Mens Rea. Statements by leading Israeli officials such as ‘we are fighting human animals and we are acting accordingly’ reflect such intent. Some go beyond a mere incitement to cause mass killing such as the statement of the Israeli Heritage Minister, suggesting that Israel should find ‘a way for Gazans that is more painful than death’. This was further reinforced through hundreds of genocidal statements made by leading Israeli officials compiled by groups such as Law for Palestine and Amnesty International, as shall be covered. In fact, a UN Official has morbidly stated that there are ‘two million sad stories in Palestine’ which have come about through a perpetration of these mass killings targeting the protected group.
With the litmus test of quantification alongside the holistic factual matrix, Israel is guilty of the first element of genocide through mass killings targeting the Palestinians as a national, cultural and racial group with the required intent to do so. The second element of this conviction is the Dolus Specialis, which requires that Israel did not only intend to cause mass killings of the Palestinians, but intended to destroy them, in whole or in part.
Category Two: Causing Serious Bodily or Mental Harm:
The second category for the actus reus of genocide under the Convention is ‘causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group’. Often what results in mass killing of a people is trauma for any survivors or future generations, as portrayed through Card’s concept of natal alienation. This concept postulates that by demonising a people, in this case Racial Palestinianisation, this would result in something worse than the death of individuals; a destruction of what made that group unique.
In our case, the second actus reus of ‘causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group’ is clearly proven through three key findings. First, is the report by Save the Children (2024) which states that ‘an entire generation of children is being irreparably damaged mentally’. Moreover, B’TSelem have reported significant systematic harm to civilians with lasting psychological trauma. Thirdly, the UN Export Statement (2023) noted ‘serious bodily and mental harm being afflicted’. From the litmus test of quantity, it can be logically inferred that there is not a single Palestinian in the Gaza Strip who has not faced serious mental harm at the very least, with the bombardment of hospitals, schools and vital infrastructure, alongside the blockade of essential humanitarian aid, which has especially placed women and children in a detrimental position.
In my estimation, merely judging this case through quantitative data risks what has been feared from the outset: the lives of real people transforming into mere numbers, through a collective identity of Palestinian legal subalternity, epitomised by Leibniz’s concept of a group of people dissipating into a ‘mass of indiscernibles’. To avoid this issue, a statement which strikes at the core of the human suffering which occurred as a result of the genocidal acts is to be presented. Mohamed, father of three, stated this as part of his experience of displacement from Rafah to the Deir Al Balah Governorate: ‘Here in Deir al-Balah, it’s like an apocalypse. There is no room for you to pitch a tent; you have to set it up near the coast… You have to protect your children from insects, from the heat, and there is no clean water, no toilets, all while the bombing never stops. You feel like you are subhuman here.’
The subhumanity mentioned by Mohamed epitomises the essence of the second actus reus of genocide. This state of victimhood which has been imposed on the Palestinian people and resulted in a damage in the core fabric of their identity as humans is exactly what was prosecuted in cases such as the Bosnian Genocide cited previously. Beyond doubt, the second Actus Reus of genocide has been met in this case. It is accompanied by the same Mens Rea proven in the first category where the second is of a lower material threshold then the first, because to harm is less than to kill. Moreover, both category One and Two are encompassed by the same genocidal policy carried out through OSOI post October 7th 2023, ranging from a variety of tactics.
Category Three: Deliberately Inflicting Conditions:
The defining authority for the third actus reus of genocide is the case of Prosecutor V Akayesu (ICTR, 1998), which was the first conviction of genocide under International Law and which clarified what ‘inflicting conditions of life’ means in practice. The judgement stated that it can include ‘deliberate deprivation of resources indispensable for survival, such as food, water, shelter and medical services’ or ‘systematic expulsion from homes’. It is summarised in its entire meaning as ‘forcing people to live in conditions where survival becomes impossible’. As demonstrated through the first two categories, the Palestinian situation post October 7th particularly depicts such acts consisting of a genocidal intent.
In essence, the Actus Reus for the first three categories of genocidal acts is met, as shown from the expert reports and quantitative data presented. Additionally, the Mens Rea for these categories is embedded within the policies of OSOI, as reinforced through political incitement and reasonable certainty.
The fourth actus reus under the Genocide Convention, which is not relevant for our case, is ‘imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group’. This was described in Prosecutor v. Akayesu (ICTR, 1998). In the case, it stated that acts such as rape and sexual violence, especially systematic or widespread, can be such a measure. This was further reinforced in Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi (ICTR, 2004) where it was held that rape can serve multiple genocidal purposes.
The final actus reus, which is also not relevant in this instance, is ‘forcibly transferring children of the group to another group’, which is very specific and rare, most closely aligning with a cultural genocide. Such reasoning was utilised in cases such as the Stolen Generation Scandal regarding the children of Australian Aborigines children getting kidnapped and assimilated into white families in what has been described as a ‘cultural and spiritual genocide’.
3.3 The Dolus Specialis of Genocide:
Beyond anything else, the key differentiator between genocide and any other international crime is the Dolus Specialis; the special intent beyond the Mens Rea for the acts themselves. As such, the ICJ held that the targeting of a specific group is not sufficient for genocide and ‘something more is required’. This intent encompasses the radical ‘mass hatred’ which motivated the attempted destruction of the protected group.
This is different to the intent of the first Actus Reus of genocide, for instance, which entails mass killing with the intent of such mass killing of that group. This is because it requires an ‘Intent to Destroy’ the protected group ‘in whole or in part’, which surpasses single acts of a genocidal nature. Additionally, it is the hardest to prove due to the threshold of evidence which may constitute such an intent. This difficulty was reflected in the report of the Dalfour Commission in 2005, where the Court decided that the Sudanese government ‘had not pursued a genocidal policy and was therefore not responsible for genocide’. The legal basis for such a judgement however, was ‘unclear’.
Such ambiguity was clarified by the ICJ in the Bosnian Genocide case, where it was ruled that a ‘combination of acts and intentions of government officials should suffice to attribute genocide to entire state apparatus.’ As a result, the Dolus Specialis was found in the case of Srebrenica as elucidated previously. Additionally, from a philosophical vantage point, the Dolus Specialis can be seen to conform with Woodruff’s definition of genocide requiring a ‘mass hatred’. This can be reflected through rhetoric utilised by the accused State through media proclamations.
The question that must now be tackled with, which is the most pertinent in this entire study, is if the actions of Israel post October 7th can be qualified with this Dolus Specialis or not. There are three primary objections that can be presented to refute this qualification.
1- Hamas and the Challenge of Factual Data:
Firstly, it can be argued that the quantitative data may be tampered or inauthentic because of the involvement of Hamas with the Palestinian Ministry of Health. This is based upon the conception that Hamas is a terrorist entity which has been proscribed as such by the IC so any reports taken from it must be done so with the utmost caution.
However, such data is corroborated by a number of NGOS alongside the UN itself, which acknowledged over 50,000 fatalities affecting the Palestinians since October 7th. Moreover, news agencies such as Al Jazeerah have reported the death toll as of April 2025 as 62,614, the vast majority of whom were women and children.
2- Partial Targeting Within a Protected Population:
Secondly, there is a question regarding whether the fact that such attacks have only happened in Gaza and not wider Palestine since October 7th, hinders it being considered as an attack on the entire protected group of the Palestinians as an ethnic, racial and national group. This can be seen to reinforce the argument that the goal of the Israeli government is not to completely eradicate Palestinians from the face of the Earth, rather only a forced displacement from Gaza which may possibly be a Crime Against Humanity but not a genocide.
However, the scenario which most clearly reflects this argument is the Holocaust; where scholars have argued there is no establishment of fact that Hitler’s Final Solution entailed killing all of the world's Jews but just those of Europe. The fact that near the end of the Nazi Regime, Hitler was considering plans of moving the Jews to Palestine acts as further proof that not intending to destroy the group from the entire world does not negate genocide. This demonstrates that geographical limitation does not have an innate hindrance for culpability for genocide.
3- Distinguishing Between Hamas and the Broader Palestinian Population:
Thirdly and most pertinently, Israel has argued that it is not in fact targeting Palestinians as a national, racial or ethnic group, but Hamas as a political entity. This is a critical point in the crossroads between a legitimate cause for war and the case for genocide. If Israel is merely attempting to defend its people from destruction then this can surely be seen as a justifiable cause.
However, this utilisation of the Subjective Approach for the identification of a group must be seen in light of the holistic factual matrix. To do so, we must observe the Mens Rea of Israeli officials as to how they define Hamas, reflected through political incitements. In fact, this utilisation of Hamas as a political entity is a further demonstration of Palestinian subalternity and the backlash that they receive from the IC when attempting to use their legal right of self determination through political resistance. This has led to scholars such as Kimmerling characterising Israeli violence as ‘politicide’ in 2003, which has now transformed into genocidal actions. Three statements from leading Israeli officials who define Hamas and the Palestinian people as synonymous prior to October 7th 2023 suffice in reflecting such an intent.
The first quote is from Moshe Feiglin, former Deputy Speaker of the Knesset who stated that ‘there are no innocent people in Gaza. The entire population is guilty of supporting Hamas’(2014). Secondly, Naftali Bennett, former Israeli Defense Minister, stated ‘the entire Palestinian population is responsible for Hamas. There is no distinction between the people and Hamas’ (2018). Thirdly, Moshe Katzav, former Israeli President stated regarding the Palestinians: ‘there are people who do not belong to our continent, to our world, but actually belong to a different galaxy’ (2001).
In a report by Amnesty International establishing a claim for genocide post October 7th, 101 statements of leading Israeli officials were examined for inciting such racial hatred bolstering an intent of destruction. Moreover, as part of the ICJ Proceedings against Israel, Law For Palestine compiled over 500 statements which allude to genocidal intent. This radical amalgamation of what the IC considers as Hostis Humani Generis compared to what is an innocent civilian population was only to be exacerbated post October 7th, which the following three quotes express.
The first is that of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who in an address to the IDF in late October 2023, stated ‘you must remember what Amalek has done to you’ citing a biblical reference in Deuteronomy calling for the complete destruction of the targeted group, making a parallel between Hamas and the Amalekites. Secondly, President Isaac Herzog of Israel made the incendiary comment that ‘it is an entire nation out there that is responsible’ clearly equivocating Hamas and the general Palestinian populus. While he maintained that his words were misinterpreted, the slogan ‘there are no uninvolved citizens’ was later found in settlements near Gaza, demonstrating the scale and effect of such statements. Thirdly, the major offensive on Rafah which led to the further displacement of millions of Palestinians occurred a week after the statement by the Israeli Finance Minister: ‘There are no half jobs done. Rafah, Deir Al Balah, Nuseirat. Destruction!’ Such statements suffice to prove the escalation of the Rule By Law through this racial Palestinianisation, to the extent that Kant’s destructive imperative must materialise; such a people must be destroyed due to their mere existence.
Moreover, even if Israel were to somehow argue that they were making a definitive distinction between the Palestinians as a civilian population and Hamas as a political entity, this still does not negate a Dolus Specialis for genocide. In a military context such as this, a State’s actions can serve ‘the dual goal of achieving a military result and destroying a group as such’ for the intent of genocide.
Therefore, from a legalistic basis using the Genocide Convention and the descriptive cases thereafter, the facts of the Gaza scenario demonstrate a clear perpetration of the required elements of genocide. The first three categories of genocidal acts have been proven, alongside a Mens Rea to perpetrate such acts against a protected group.
Additionally, the Dolus Specialis has been established, taking into consideration the holistic factual matrix. This entails the policies of OSOI and wider factors such as political statements and the scale of destruction which indicate an attempt to destroy the protected group, in whole or in part. This means that Israel is guilty of committing a genocide against the Palestinian people.
From its inception point Israel has attempted to retain its hegemony in the region by maintaining the status quo set by the British Mandate, of Palestinian legal subalternity. This was done by whatever means possible, often involving violence, displacement, killings and systematic oppression. Such a scenario set the stage for what has been described as an ‘incremental genocide’. On October 7th 2023, Palestinian resistance fighters attempted to exercise the legal right of self determination; a move which involved violence. This violence was generally endorsed as a legal right under Resolution 3070 of the GA, whilst certain acts may have been crimes. As a result, Israeli violence was exacerbated on an unprecedented scale accompanied by a radical intent to destroy; it has been proven that the actions that have taken place since October 7th by Israel have amounted to a genocide against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip.
4- Enforcing the Prevention of Genocide:
The Genocide Convention, therefore, acts as a mechanism to deal with the crime of genocide. It has developed over time into a legal instrument which is theoretically sound and effective in identifying the genocide; but the practical instantiations reflect a very different reality. The reasons for this disparity between the theory and the practice are twofold: the eurocentric bias instilled within the IC through the Rule By Law alongside the lack of enforcement mechanism.
4.1 Existing Entities:
The two entities that are designed to deal with crimes such as genocide are the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). It is to be found that neither of these bodies are competent in punishing genocide, let alone in preventing it from occurring. An alternative to these two entities will be offered, which stands as theoretically sound but may lack practical implementation.
The International Court of Justice:
The furthest that the IC as a whole administrative mechanism got to tackling the issue of the Palestinian genocide was the South African ICJ Case against Israel in 2024. This was an attempt by South Africa to prove genocide was occuring in Gaza but there have been a number of criticisms of the report. Two criticisms suffice in portraying the issues with the report.
Firstly, a detailed critique has been written regarding the ICJ finding by BADIL which argued that the ICJ was basing its findings from the wrong vantage point by neglecting the holistic factual matrix and instead focusing on a particular time frame in isolation. I concur with this criticism which is why this research has attempted to focus on the entire factual matrix and has not relied upon the ICJ proceedings.
Secondly, the fact that the proceedings are ongoing over 16 months later portrays the incompetence of such a mechanism in an attempt to prevent genocide. In fact, the ICJ has merely suggested a ‘plausible genocide’ with a recommendation of Israel to prevent any acts which may be perceived as genocidal and to prevent and punish incitement to genocide. Israel, of course, denies any such things occurring in the first instance.
This is not due to an issue with the Genocide Convention but because of a wider institutional lacuna within the IC; there is no effective mechanism to effectively punish genocide, let alone prevent it from occurring.
State convictions fall under the jurisdiction of the ICJ. Yet, as demonstrated in the outcome of the South African Appeal and its general lack of enforcement powers, the ICJ has been described as merely relying ‘on good faith’ rather than holding actual power. In a case such as this, where the Rule By Law has accommodated for a racial Palestianisation, this is a disastrous state of affairs. The only international entity which can conclusively describe any given situation as genocidal on behalf of the IC is silenced. In fact, if the ICJ proceedings were brought against Israel by Palestine itself, leading lawyers have suggested that Israel would merely refuse to partake in the case.
The International Criminal Court:
For individual prosecution of state officials, the ICC stands as the body of enforcement. Again, through the indictment by the Lead Prosecutor of the ICC, Karim Khan, of Benjamin Netanyahu and other officials for Crimes Against Humanity, and the complete lack of action thereafter- the body lacks any effective mechanism of implementation and as such, merely reinforces a rhetorical soundbite. In fact, the entity of Israel is not even a ratified member of the ICC, though Palestine is. As such, the ICC has been described as ‘the Mcdonaldization of justice’ by Ritler due to its overarching incapacity.
Without elaborating into further detail, it suffices that leading international lawyers have described both entities as futile in reaching their desired objectives. I would suggest that the reason for this is because they are inherently reliant upon the power structures enmeshed within the IC with no hope of escape. Therefore, I would offer an alternative, as offered by scholars for over 20 years: an independent entity must be constructed which has its own army and power structure, thus acting independently of the IC, as opposed to the merely rhetorical, procedural powers awarded to the ICC and ICJ.
4.2 An Alternative: Leviathan:
Ultimately, a Leviathan is required to override the Rule By Law. The purpose of such an entity will be to tackle Genocide alongside all high scale state led atrocities, independently of any biases towards the relevant State. This will in turn avoid the ‘fertile ground in which genocide could grow and even thrive’ which is the Rule By Law stratagem instilled within the IC.
There are two immediate issues which arise from this conceptualisation of dealing with international wrongs. The first is that it seems inconceivable due to a lack of practicality. Where the Genocide Convention was considered as being ‘unrealistic and impracticable’, the Leviathan Mechanism would be met with far fiercer opposition. However, the purpose of this Leviathan is not to punish the genocide after it has occurred, but to prevent it from occurring in the first place. As such, it will create an investigative entity to search for early signs of genocide to prevent it from even occuring.
Secondly, the mechanism can be seen to be problematic because it impinges on State sovereignty. In fact, this has been the underlying feature throughout this essay; a World Order hellbent on preserving its hegemony on the Global Stage and in perpetrating injustices on the Hostis Humani Generis due to the Kantian imperative of self prioritisation.
However, in order to embody the nature of a truly liberal, egalitarian International Community, there must be cooperation and justice. This methodology requires an abandoning of the ‘Rule By Law’ faculty, just like Empire was abandoned before it, unless the former acts as a mere regeneration of the latter.
This alternative, in the context of the genocide against the Palestinians in Gaza through ‘mass hatred’, facilitated by the IC through the Bystander Syndrome and through ineffective procedural entities of prevention, has never been more urgent. However, what is to be realistically expected is a maintenance of the status quo, as encapsulated by Professor Finkelstein who stoically resigns that he does not have ‘any expectations from International Law.’
4.3 Concluding Remarks:
This essay has attempted to delineate the reasons as to why a disparity occurs between International Law and its distribution of justice. Primarily, this has been attributed to a deeply embedded colonial bias within the IC which is actualised through ‘Rule By Law’ violence and Bystander silence. This theoretic abstraction has been epitomised in the actions of Israel towards the Palestinians, particularly in the Gaza strip. From the Just War Theory and the Genocide framework, the latter has been chosen as more relevant for this case. This is because of the Dolus Specialis which has arisen due to decades of animosity towards the Palestinian people by the colonial project of Israel. This has been either endorsed through military aid and support by countries such as the US, or endorsed through inaction by what has been described as a ‘Bystander Syndrome’ suffered by the collective IC.
This genocide has taken a more brutally explicit form since the Palestinian resistance operation which occurred on October 7th 2023, reflected in the level of destruction. The global silence practiced by the IC and the subsequent incompetence of the procedural mechanisms have omitted all active responsibility of genocide prevention. Whilst an alternative has been offered, it is likely that such power structures will remain as they are.
6- Bibliography:
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Document Title | Citation |
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) | [1986] ICJ Rep 14 |
Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Judgment) | [2003] ICJ Rep 161 |
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) | [2007] ICJ Rep 43 |
Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro (Judgment) | [2007] ICJ Rep 43 |
Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion | [2024] ICJ Rep (Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024) |
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v Israel) (Provisional Measures Order) | [2024] |
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Document Title | Citation |
UNGA Res 181 (II) (29 November 1947) | UN Doc A/RES/181(II) |
UNGA Res 96 (I) (11 December 1946) | UN Doc A/RES/96(I) |
UNGA Res 2649 (XXV), The Question of the International Status of South Africa (1970) | UN Doc A/RES/2649 (XXV) |
UNGA Res 3070 (XXVIII), The Question of Palestine (1973) | UN Doc A/RES/3070 (XXVIII) |
UN Commission on Human Rights Res S-5/1, ‘Grave and massive violations of the human rights of the Palestinian people by Israel’ (2000) | UN Doc E/CN.4/S-5/1 |
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ILC, Fourth Report on the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind by Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur (11 March 1986) | UN Doc A/CN.4/398 |
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International Criminal Tribunals:
Case | Citation |
The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu (Trial Judgment) | ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) |
The Prosecutor v Sylvestre Gacumbitsi (Trial Judgment) | ICTR-2001-64-T (2004) |
France and others v Hermann Göring and others (Judgment and Sentence) | [1946] 22 IMT 203 |
Historical and Other Reports:
Title | Citation |
Palestine Royal Commission, Report of the Palestine Royal Commission | Cmd 5479 (1937) |
The Public Prosecutor v Efraín Ríos Montt (Trial Judgment) | Judicial Body of Guatemala, 10 May 2013 |
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