Palestine at the Eleventh Hour: The Futility of State Recognition
- Umar Majeed
- Aug 5
- 10 min read
Introduction:
On July 24th, 2025, French President Macron became the first from the G7 Nations to announce that France would recognise Palestinian Statehood at the UN General Assembly in September. This sparked international discourse, with US President Trump commenting, ‘what he said doesn’t matter… it doesn’t carry any weight’. Further, UK Prime Minister Starmer, in his usual fashion, stuttered and mumbled, denying that Britain would follow course in recognition. Shockingly, or not, on July 29th, he announced that Britain would be recognising a sovereign Palestinian State, effectively on the condition that Israel makes no efforts to resolve the predicament. Many other Western States jumped on the bandwagon of Palestinian recognition, following the course of the Grandfather States. 1
The question that will be sought to be answered in this article is why this action is being taken now, after a year and a half of an actual genocide, and nearly a century of incremental genocide against the Palestinian population. Such a genocide was, and still is, explicitly conducted by the rogue entity of Israel, under the endorsement of the Grandfather States and wider complicity by the entire International Community, due to holistic political and military inertia.
This article will begin by discussing the nature of Statehood from two vantage points: the contemporary International Order and the Plurality of Governance during the era of the Caliphate. This is pertinent when exploring the Palestinian situation because such a scenario must be examined holistically, and not merely from the point of Western intervention during the British Mandate Period.
This will be compared with the Israeli claim to Statehood, to establish which of the two has stronger legal and moral grounds to be endowed with Statehood. Thereafter, the current recognition tactic will be critically dismantled through a consideration of all potential reasons for such a move at this stage in the genocide: the Eleventh Hour.
The Question of Statehood: The Palestinian Claim entrenched in provenance
There is an international legal consensus that the Palestinian people have a right to self-determination. Self-determination is defined, as a principle of International Law, as ‘a legal right of all peoples… to freely decide their political status.’2 Additionally, in the context of Palestine, self-determination is intrinsically associated with the establishment of Statehood because of the nature of the colonial project, which initially impinged its ‘inalienable rights’. This was stressed in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3236 in 1974, which, though not binding, made one very critical point, beyond affirming the ‘inalienable right of Palestinian self-determination’, namely:
The Resolution ‘Emphasises that full respect for and the realisation of these inalienable rights of the Palestinian people are indispensable for the solution of the question of Palestine’: in essence, Palestinian Statehood (through ‘The right to national independence and sovereignty’) and self-determination are the only way to peace.
This was in 1974. There could be no other solution than to return the land of the Palestinians to them; the only alternatives are ethnic cleansing and genocide. With a lack of enforcement mechanisms, the latter options were chosen by Israel.
Additionally, in 2012, the UN General Assembly granted Palestine Non-Observer Member Status and explicitly recognised it as ‘The State of Palestine’.
Furthermore, the right to self-determination is widely recognised as a jus cogens norm in International Law, meaning it is universally binding, non-derogable, and no state may lawfully opt out of recognising it.
The Counter Narrative:
The argument made by Zionists is as follows: before the British Mandate, there was no Palestinian State. Instead, it was governed by the Ottoman Caliphate, and as such, the first attempt for it to gain Statehood was bequeathed to it by the Western International Order in the shape of the 1949 UN Partition Plan, suggesting a two-state solution. Subsequently, they argue that the disastrous Nakba was due to the doing of the Palestinians themselves for not cooperating with ‘the civilised world’ in reaching a peaceful solution. Decades after, under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, the claim to Palestinian Statehood and its related territorial sovereignty was restated.
This narrative is riddled with inconsistencies, coupled with blatant factual inaccuracies. Firstly, it has an implicit Eurocentric colonial bias towards the Western paradigm of the Law of Nations, which is only due to the post-World War 1 plunder. It suggests that there was no form of independent governance before the creation of the nation-states: the Plurality of Governance in the International sphere during the era of the Caliphate signifies something else.
The Paradigm of Plurality of Governance under the Ottoman Caliphate:
Under the Ottoman Empire, the Palestinian people had autonomy to govern themselves as a vilayet under the wider system of governance of the Caliphate. Arguably, this is less restrictive to territorial sovereignty than the economic coercion brutally imposed by the Grand Father States through control of finances and global economic welfare distribution. Interestingly, the Palestinian Vilayet met the conditions of Statehood according to the modern Western paradigm during the era of the Caliphate, before the British Mandate, whereas Israel did not even exist. As such, the right to self-determination would entail a holistic liberation of the lands of Palestine according to the territory of the vilayet under the administration of the Caliphate.
According to the Western paradigm, there are four criteria for statehood to be achieved under the Montevideo Convention3:
Population.
Territory.
Government.
Capacity to enter into legal relations with other States.
To point to the obvious, the Palestinians met these criteria before the colonial project initiated by the British Empire. Yet, after the Mandate period, it no longer met the criteria of territory due to the subsequent creation of the entity of Israel. Thereafter, the right of ‘self-determination’ was embedded in International Resolutions for the Palestinian people, to reclaim the land that was stolen from them.
The Question of Statehood: The Israeli Claim
Just as the Palestinian claim to Statehood fails based on the territorial expansionism of Israel, which means that it does not have a set territory, Israel also fails the objective test for Statehood based on the same reason.
Yet, there are two methods of recognition: the declarative theory and the constitutive theory. The former states that the four criteria must be met for recognition, the latter theory argues that they technically do not have to be met, so long as the entity practically operates as a State, particularly regarding its conduct and diplomacy with the wider International Community.
Yet, this points towards an important principle that has been distorted as a political trope post October 7th to support the genocide against the Palestinians. Namely, ‘Israel has the right to exist, therefore, by natural extension, it has the right to defend itself.’ Firstly, no State ‘has the right to exist’ under International Law: it either does or does not. Secondly, self-defence, as entrenched in Article 51 of the UN Charter, must be in response to the occurrence of ‘an armed attack’. Without delving into the different forms of self-defence, or the requirements within acts of self-defence: Israel’s actions post October 7th did not warrant the legal justification of self-defence because the Palestinian operation of resistance which occurred was in response to decades of brutalisation and consistent aggression against the Palestinian people and an impingement of territorial sovereignty of the State of Palestine.
Therefore, Statehood and self-determination are two principles that are already legally enshrined for the Palestinian people. The only aid a State can have in these goals is material advancement through military or economic support.
The Purpose and Effects of Recognition:
Recognition of the Palestinian State has already been made by 139 out of 193 UN Member States. A major milestone which led to this was the 1988 Declaration of Independence, where over 70 States recognised Palestine within weeks. As such, the trope that recognition in September will have any material effect, without military intervention, is foolish.
Recognition empty of the mechanisms of resolution is futile. From critical thought and extensive research, I can deduce three key incentives as to why such a move of recognition is occurring at this point in the genocide.
1 - Recognition (by the West) is threatened as a deterrence for Israel
This is the most common argument being propagated by the Western Grandfather States and their flock. Essentially, it proposes that the purpose behind this new effort to recognise Palestinian Statehood is a warning of actions that may possibly be taken if Israel does not cease its genocidal conduct. It is flawed on three fronts.
Firstly, it attempts to compensate Western complicity through silence since the inception of the genocide by threatening to take a verbal stance which has already been solidified by the Law and more than 100 States for over 30 years. A major breakthrough in Western political morality.
Secondly, the pretence of sympathy is self-defeating; this is because the mode of expression is the same as it has always been: semantic rhetoric rather than real action. The West has never had an issue in solidarity with victims, so long as it did not involve crossing the boundary of Israel’s tolerance level. This situation is no different; recognition will not occur - the Western Moros is merely threatening to raise its voice in its own echo chamber of screams.
Thirdly, even if recognition were to occur in September by every Nation within the International Community, it will mean nothing without two conditions. Firstly, for immediate military intervention in the occupied Palestinian territories, including, but not limited to, the Gaza Strip. If the Western Moros is sincere in its attempt to end the genocide, it must create a Coalition of the Willing4, just as was created when a threat to Ukrainian sovereignty arose, more so, because there is no credible claim that Russia is waging a genocide against Ukrainians.
A counterargument to this may actually be found in the very Resolution which recognised Palestinian Statehood and Self Determination in 1974, as aforementioned. In particular, it states that the Palestinians have ‘the right to self-determination without external interference’. This implies that the only onus upon external parties is to support and recognise that right, but not to endorse it through military or actual efforts.
However, this would be a rather superficial reading of such a document because it does not consider the context in which it was drafted. Such an expression was made to prevent another 1948 or 1967 Israeli-Arab War, where the goal of the UN is to create international harmony. In a situation of genocide, such efforts are legally obligated according to the diktats of justice and moral consistency. Complicity through the silence of Bystander States is the opposite of international harmony: it is the condoning of injustice and terrorism.
Secondly, complete justice must occur through the Hague and death penalties to Israeli politicians who were responsible for causing the atrocities against the Palestinian civilians in Gaza, just as was established against the Nazis. Such spawns of Moros went further than Hitler did in the Final Solution through missile strikes and raining destruction on one of the most densely populated areas in the world.
Yet, the purpose of recognition being to deter Israel is rather weak because Israel knows full well that legal means and procedures mean nothing in comparison to military action: this is elucidated in the arrest warrants for Israeli politicians by the ICC and the claims of genocide against the Palestinians by major NGOS. As such, it is not a very effective deterrent. However, even if the purpose of recognition were to deter Israel, it certainly is not one to be celebrated, as some politically illiterate individuals may think. This is because it is not preventing the genocide. By September, the Gaza Strip may well be completely destroyed, alongside all of the civilian inhabitants who belong there.
2 - Recognition (by Arab States) is to incentivise the Palestinians to disarm
This argument is the most ironic in the plethora of contradictory semantics that have arisen. It argues that if the Palestinian resistance groups were to disarm, then the Arab States would proceed with recognition of Palestinian Self-Determination, and by extension, Statehood. In a nutshell: if they give up arms, they can take back their land (through which they are legally permitted, and practically required, to use force).
For such an absurd notion to stand in the court of moral consistency and political justice, it must provide the mechanisms for self-determination internally. This involves going beyond a mere Coalition of the Willing, to something like that of Bush’s ‘War of Terror’ justified through the guise of humanitarian intervention: a wrong has occurred which is so bad that it can only be resolved through significant military might.
3 - Recognition is occurring now because it is futile
In my submission, this point seems to allude to the morbid truth. The West and its Allies may proceed with recognition of Statehood and Self Determination for the Palestinians because, from their perspective, the Palestinians are on a road with no way home. In essence, it makes no concrete difference whatsoever, other than to save their face through empty rhetoric, of which the Law has become.
As such, it is not that the International Community will proceed with recognition because it is not coupled with action, and as such, it is ineffective. Rather, it can even proceed to use military means, but it was timed to such perfection that it would not make a difference in reaching that goal of Statehood, which impinges Israeli colonialism.
Conclusion:
This recent predicament, beyond anything else, reflects the naivety embedded within our communities. Many still seem hopeful that the West will offer a lifeline in the Eleventh Hour, as a sort of saviour or epic hero in this nightmarish tragedy. Beyond anything else, this reflects much about our collective psyche.
From a legal perspective, recognition of Palestinian Statehood is not revolutionary, nor a political breakthrough. Only through military intervention and an immediate prevention of the genocide in Gaza can the International Community begin to atone for its complicity over the past year and a half, and by extension, over the last century of colonial brutality against the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.
Notes:
1 Grandfather States refer to the States which maintain the hegemonic status of the World Order, either due to hereditary colonialism or military and technological might. For more information, see (The Grandfather States and the Status Quo - Released Soon).
2 Common Article 1 of the ICCPR & ICESCR.
3 The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933) is the litmus test for Statehood under International Law.
4 Coalition of the willing: This is when a group of States decides to join forces to resolve a common issue, often in situations of international turmoil.
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