The Syrian Catastrophe: Imperial Overreach of Westphalian Legitimacy
- Umar Majeed
- Nov 22
- 22 min read
Abstract:
This research tackles the question of legitimacy from the paradigm of International Governance. It attempts to draw an understanding between Realpolitik, through which international governance is dictated by a linear ideological mechanism, and the spirit of true democracy, which ensures the consent of the willing in a governmental structure that is of their own choice, not one that is imposed upon them. The case study of Syria will be utilised to unpack key themes surrounding legitimacy and its discontent, alongside potential solutions.
Contents Page (Click to Navigate Sections);
1-Introduction:
For centuries, the question of legitimacy has dominated discussions in political theory and International Relations. Yet, despite the progressive course of modernity, such discourse has not paled in significance. In fact, phenomena such as the Arab Spring have failed to resolve the ambiguities surrounding State Hegemony and authority, instead serving to exacerbate the questions. Inquiries such as: ‘Who has the right to rule? To what standard are they held to? Who has the implicit power to remove and uphold State leadership, or otherwise topple the entire mechanism of governance?’ remains lingering.
This paper aims to demonstrate that the concept of universal Westphalian legitimacy is riddled with internal contradictions and, as such, serves as an example of ideological ‘imperial overreach’.[1] To explicate this point of enquiry, the case study of Syria will be utilised. Syria serves as a particularly relevant instantiation for examining notions of legitimacy due to the plethora of political manifestations it has assumed over its relatively short spanned existence.
As such, this study will be compartmentalised into two sections. The first will attempt to define the origins of legitimacy in International Relations. Furthermore, it will explore pertinent questions such as: How is legitimacy defined? Is there, or ought there be, a linear metric of governance in accordance with a single political ideology? If so, what should happen to the anomalies within the system, should they be expelled to the abyss and, as such, labelled as part of the Hostis Humani Generis, to remain in a limbo between political agency and anarchical destruction until they adopt the linear metric?
The second element of this paper will apply the framework of legitimacy within the context of the Syrian issue. In doing so, it will utilise a socio-historical and theoretical methodology. It will address pertinent themes through key thinkers who contributed to the term of legitimacy in political theory, whilst exploring different forms of governance in Syria over the past 100 years, namely: from an Ottoman Vilayet, to a French Mandate, to a Socialist State, to what can now be described as a ‘Failed State’.
2-Part One: Legitimacy and Its Discontent Defined:
Understanding the Origins of Western Notions of Legitimacy
To understand legitimacy, one must examine the principle of State Sovereignty, which is the defining factor of the Western governance mechanism.
The origins of State Sovereignty as a concept derive from the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), as opined by Kissinger, who concluded, ‘The Peace of Westphalia became a turning point in the history of nations because… the State... was affirmed as the building block of European order. The concept of state sovereignty was established.[2] This marked the end of the temporal agency of Institutionalised Religion in Europe. It was this template of secular governance which was to shape the future of the International Order.
However, the nature of sovereignty must be understood within the political context of its emergence within Europe. To do so, one must examine the State-centric, nationalistic identity which grew as a necessary offshoot from the 30 Year War - the growth of Protestantism shattered the already fragile theocentric Polity which previously assumed a central institutionalised position on the continent.
Defining Legitimacy
As noted by Wideen, the definition of legitimacy in the scholarly sphere ‘subsumes at least three different meanings’. First, legitimacy may connote a moral right to rule (as held in the lands of Christendom before the Peace of Westphalia, explicated through the Doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings). Secondly, it may be utilised ‘as a synonym for popularity’ (as depicted in contemporary mechanisms of democratic governance). Thirdly, legitimacy can be interpreted through the paradigm brought forth by Max Weber, who defined the concept as ‘a belief in the general appropriateness of a regime, practice or leader’ (which he then used to provide a taxonomy as to the types of legitimacy).
This research will focus on legitimacy from the lens of the second and third interpretations: of popularity, which is also pertinent in the key premise of Weber’s theory of legitimate governance. This is most clearly shown when answering the question: The belief of whom? This must be measured from the metric point of populism, as a general ethos of inclination towards a particular ideology of methodological governance. It must be the belief of the clear majority from a cross-demographic of the populace for it to be truly reflective of the ethos of the ‘State’ as a unique manifestation of communal identity.
As such, the concept of Weber will be explicated alongside the taxonomy proposed by numerous thinkers in International Relations, such as Hinnebusch[3] and Beetham[4], regarding internal and external forms of legitimacy.
External legitimacy is the collective system of governments recognising one another as valid. There are various metrics for measuring this, most pertinently, factors such as membership in fundamentally integrated institutions, such as the United Nations, and, to a lesser extent, considerations of bilateral and multilateral treaties to enhance economic relations.
The concept of internal legitimacy can be described as the right of all peoples to govern their own affairs and achieve true self-determination. This premise is entrenched within the Westphalian paradigm of the World Order[5], yet it falls under a fatal contradiction when considering other pertinent principles, such as Realpolitik and External Legitimacy.
Further, I would suggest internal legitimacy can be defined as ‘communal adherence, derived from either social conviction or social duress, to the validity of an effective governing mechanism.’ This will serve as a broad, and generally encapsulating, definition which can be applied effectively to the case study of Syria, whilst being aware that it differs from other reputable scholars, such as Wedeen, who considered soft power actions of accepting the rulership of a political mechanism, such as getting a job or going to the shops, being insufficient to bestow legitimacy, rather acting as a social obligation for any basic anthropological functioning.
In essence, if the people of the State choose to legitimise a form of governance that is intrinsically contrary to the status quo of the system of Western International Law, will this be considered as externally legitimate (by the International Community) or will it be deemed as a Casus Beli, thus requiring an extermination of such a stream of thought, by any means necessary?
Understanding Social Conviction and Coercion:
Social conviction can be seen to describe the alignment of a populace with the ideals and policies of the State. There are a plethora of factors through which conviction may manifest itself, from economic domestic policy, foreign national policy, to religious and ideological reference points of belonging. As such, when these reference points genuinely align between the governed and the governing, the State will embellish its legitimacy with its populace.
However, such policies can be forged through State propaganda, designed to gain the approval of the people, irrespective of the blatant lie which it is attempting to portray. In fact, such propaganda may go a step further, where, through totalitarian measures, even though all parties are aware of its deceptive nature, they will adhere to the propaganda, by the State tropes and slogans, in fear of what may come after non-compliance. This can accurately be labelled as social coercion. However, social coercion does not necessarily eradicate the internal legitimacy of any given regime. Instead, by adhering to the status quo and the image concocted by the fear of that which may come, which remains in potentia, not exerted through reality, does not diminish the actual legitimacy which has been gained by the State. The fine line between illegitimacy and legitimacy, already established and further embellished through social coercion, is where there is an absence of actual force, which is exerted through a domestic equilibrium.
The Imperial Overreach of Westphalian Notions of Legitimacy
‘Imperial overreach’ as a concept describes the eventual degradation of an Empire within any given colony, causing its incremental collapse. This principle can be explicated beyond physical conquest, to remits such as legal mechanisms of governance. Just as the Imperial Overreach of the EIC in the British Raj led to the recognition of three autonomous States, the injection of democracy into the Middle East reflects an Imperial Overreach of the concept of external legitimacy based on the Westphalian paradigm, which is adequately confined to the borders of Europe, beyond which it stagnates and does not work.
After the Thirty Years’ War, there was a dimensional shift in State policy, away from a theocentric unity, towards a materialist hyperfixation on the nation-state. This worked in Europe for multiple reasons; among which was the natural compartmentalisation of State and Church in accordance with classical Christian theology, as well as the unprecedented growth in Protestantism. The fact that it worked to create a thriving World Order within the Eurocentric paradigm was not a precedent to guarantee universal success.
Thus, it was the socio-political imperial overreach, exacerbated through notions of moral superiority and comparatively advanced technology, which led to this Westphalian notion of legitimacy based upon the validity of the Nation State, being enmeshed into a global political methodology, or World Order.
It will be suggested in this research that the modern nation-state model has led to a disastrous political climate in the Middle East, most pertinently because the Westphalian paradigm could not be applied universally.
This is proven through the following logical argument based upon definitional premises: internal legitimacy can generally be expressed as the consent of the willing populace. Further, external legitimacy is delineated as an ideological conformity of all States to become initiated into the International Community, for the purpose of upholding the political equilibrium. From the Westphalian Paradigm, this equilibrium is entrenched in the linear ideology of liberalism, which serves as the ideological backbone of the contemporary International Order. However, if a nation, such as Syria, opts for a government ruling according to the ideology of ‘Islamism’, deemed as internally legitimate, will it also be afforded membership of the ‘Universal Order’, despite its mutual opposition to liberalism?
Syria serves as a pertinent example of translating this theoretical Mind Game into the practical paradigm, given the potential occurrence through regime change, which left shockwaves across the world.
Part Two: Application to the Syrian Context:
The Question of Syria: Phases of (Il)legitimacy
Syria is an interesting case study because of the multiple forms of governance it has experienced. Before the First World War, it possessed semi-autonomous territorial control as a Vilayet under the overarching structure of the Ottoman Empire. This meant that the society could retain its culture, language and history, without any undue foreign interference by imperial rule. This was to change shortly in the aftermath of World War I.
The first stage of Syrian governance to examine political legitimacy, or the lack thereof, was the French Mandate promulgated by the League of Nations following the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. This political dominance was undoubtedly illegitimate when considering any paradigm of legitimacy. Instead, it impinged upon the territorial sovereignty of an autonomous people, for whom democratic rights should have afforded further independence, rather than impinging upon the political utility which they already exercised.
In 1920, in the aftermath of World War I, the Sykes-Picot Treaty was promulgated, following the Treaty of Sèvres, resulting in the arbitrary division of the territories in the Middle East. Previously considered as Vilayets under the Ottoman Empire, and as such were operating under semi-autonomous governorship, these territories were subjugated to colonial authority by Western States, primarily Britain and France.
Syria was claimed by France to be ruled as a Mandate, ostensibly for the purpose of preparing the route to self-determination. In reality, the motives lay in the strategic power that Syria held in the Middle East, as a highly contested territory fought over between the Vichy and Free French forces.[6] A duty of care towards the civilisational enhancement of the natives was, if anything, tertiary in terms of the priorities of the colonisers.
Was this governance legitimate? According to the general description of the consent of the governed, it certainly was not. Further, from the three interpretations of internal legitimacy offered by Wedeen, the Western mandates as a whole in the Middle East did not fulfil a single view of internal legitimacy. This was brutally demonstrated, in the context of Syria, through the Great Syrian Revolt (1925-27) against French occupation.[7]
However, could it converge with the concept of external legitimacy, in the aftermath of the First World War, with the rapid escalation to global dominance in political ideology? The answer was yes, as demonstrated through the Treaty of Sèvres itself; Realpolitik disguised through the veil of legality.
The illegitimacy of this stage can be proven through three paradigms. First, from the perspective of International Law and the principle of territorial sovereignty, as embedded within the UN Charter. Whilst one may argue that the Mandate period was prior to the formation of the Charter of the United Nations, this does not discount the principle which was expressed, namely the right of all people to govern themselves and attain true self-determination. Further, it may be argued that the League of Nations endorsed the legitimacy of the regime, yet this strikes at the core of the tension and ostensible contradiction between internal and external forms of legitimacy.
Secondly, the illegitimacy of the French Mandate can be disproven through the Weberian paradigm. According to Max Weber, there are three types of legitimate rulers, the first (which has already been discarded in this instance) is the legal rational authority, endowed through Laws. Further, whilst the League of Nations proclamation may be considered as ‘Law’ in the broader sense of legislative imposition, it fails the requirement of being accepted by the native population themselves. The second form of rulers is from the charismatic authority, in an individual who inspires awe in the people that he governs, such as Gandhi. Again, this would be discarded through the brutal corporate nature of the French regime and the number of rebellions that were carried out by the people, leading up to the Great Syrian Revolt. Finally, Weber opined that a regime may express traditional authority, based upon doctrinal precedence or inherited status. The cultural disparity that the West introduced to their respective mandates was sufficient to demonstrate their lack of traditional authority.
Thirdly, the legitimacy of the French Mandate can be discarded based on the overarching tension between internal and external legitimacy. Whilst the League of Nations accord may suffice to demonstrate an external legitimacy for the creation of the Mandate, this does not insinuate that they have attained internal legitimacy, nor, for that matter, did they seem to care. The climactic moment which exacerbated this discontent with colonial foreign rule was the Great Syrian War (1925-1927).
Military Disequilibrium:
The second phase of political governance in Syria was a series of military coups d’etat and short-lived leadership positions, which often ended as quickly as they began. This successive period of regime change led to a political precedent in the Syrian context. There would be a lack of trust in true political representation, a constant wariness of despotism and tyranny, whilst looking towards the inevitable. As such, it would be a rather futile task to evaluate every government in the history of Syria regarding its legitimacy, or lack thereof.
This period can be described as the people’s attempt to gain an independent form of governance. The role of hard power, such as the army and the bourgeoisie, cannot be downplayed at this junction; yet, the plethora of leading figures during this period, lack the quality of effective governance, as demonstrated through incontinuity and political disruption to avoid the formation of any true status quo from taking shape, even from the perspective of communal identity and agreement.
Instead, the period between 1946-1963 (between the Declaration of Syrian Independence and the inception of the Ba'athist Assad Regime) is going to be glanced past at this junction, most importantly because it does not add substance to the thesis point of how Westphalian Legitimacy in the Middle East acts as a demonstration of ideologically achieving ‘imperial overreach’, further riddled with intrinsic inconsistencies.
As such, this may serve as a fitting juncture to visit the Ba'athist Regime of Hafiz Al Assad, which was to strike the cord of what legitimacy means in the Middle East.
The Ba'athist Regime:
It must be submitted that Hafez Al Asad did gain legitimacy from the beginning of his reign through to the years that would follow. However, this was to fade away with a problematic domestic policy which did little to successfully balance the disequilibrium which occurred through the governance of a Shia minority over a Sunni Majority. This demographic makeup was to play a huge role in the legitimacy of the Ba'athist Regime, because it was beyond mere ideological uniformity, but involved a variety of conflicting factors, including sectarianism, foreign policy romanticisation, as well as the undeniable conflicting ideological stances held amongst residents of the State.
At the beginning of Hafiz Al Assad’s regime, he undoubtedly established himself as a leading figure, even formulating a national ethos of his ‘god-like’ character. As such, he was appealing to internal legitimacy through the Weberian paradigm of charisma; he succeeded in doing so.
There were three main methods that the Assad regime utilised to retain legitimacy during its reign for over 50 years.
The first was through policy considerations: the attempts to create a market boom (economic policy) and unifying on destroying a collective enemy, which happened to be the colonial project of Israel (foreign policy). It was through these policies that the propaganda had the effect of enhancing the credibility of Hafiz Al-Assad as possessing charismatic legitimacy (as elucidated by Weber).
One example suffices to demonstrate the early attempts of Assad to formulate a mechanism of economic effectiveness. Following the 1973 oil crisis, a number of oil-rich States aided the deficit, which enhanced the national credentials of Assad as exhibiting charismatic legitimacy. This aid brought in foreign currency, while also boosting public spending and development projects. From the Latakia Port expansion to the General Establishment for Chemical Industries, the decade highlighted economic stability and long-awaited modernisation through such projects. The result was the annual GDP Growth averaging around 7% by the end of the 1970s[8].
The second was through the structural makeup of the State. Under the Ba'athist regime, the Syrian State found a unified mechanism after decades of civil battles and strife. Through controlling major industries and beginning an incremental process of moderate liberalisation, the regime managed to create a State infrastructure built upon Orwellian control and opening the doors to totalitarian limitations; the antithesis of the free market introduced to its Western counterparts.
Thirdly, the ideological allegiances of the Assad regime to Pan Arabism through the concept of Ba'athism enhanced the rights of minorities, such as Christians and Alewites, providing a unifying ideology, not based upon the dictates of religious reference, but built from an Arab-centric parameter of belonging, in a State which had become culturally divided through a post-colonial sentiment.
Social Conviction in Bathist Syria:
Social conviction was present during the early years of the Ba'athist regime through the control of Hafiz Assad. This is because it brought the people relief through domestic equilibrium, after decades of coups and revolutions. Further, it provided ideological conformity based upon the concept of Pan Arabism, providing a point of reference catering to a cross-demographic of the State, beyond religious convictions. As such, the ideology of Bathism was a particularly important tool for the Assad regime to establish itself, due to its inherent setback of comprising a religious minority within a minority (namely, Alewites, who are rejected by all mainstream Muslim groups, including Shias).
This social conviction was enmeshed within the political DNA of the State for decades. The turning point was the Incident of Hama in 1982, after which it mutated into a social coercion, then transmuted into outright war.
What went wrong?
Arguably, the massacre of Hama signified the beginning of the end for the legitimacy of Hafiz Assad’s regime. This brutal repression of the Muslim Brotherhood, alongside the subsequent killings of numerous civilians, epitomised the disparity between the totalitarian liberalism practised by the Bathists, in comparison to Human Rights principles such as the freedom of expression.
Following the consolidation of the Muslim Brotherhood as an antithesis to the socialist ideology of Ba'athism, Hama was the breaking point. In 1982, there was a rebellion by armed dissidents belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood. The response of the regime was the epitome of their brutalisation, not only towards all forms of opposition to the status quo, which was still lacking in true equilibrium, but towards the religious majority of the populace: Sunni Muslims.
Hama, an infamous city embodying the Sunni identity, was a hermeneutic indicator binding the conceptualisation of Sunnism. As such, its destruction in response to the Muslim Brotherhood was a heteronous impingement of the anthropological identity of the civilians, hence exacerbating an alienation which was becoming constructed through a superficially designed hierarchy, controlled by a religious and ideological minority. It could only last for so long; the incident of Hama marked the beginning of the end of the Ba'athist regime.
In regard to Bashar’s regime, it attempted to retain the charismatic legitimacy that was embodied in the metric of the communal state psyche for decades through the efforts of his father. Yet, the reactionary attacks and repressions which occurred after the peaceful civil demonstrations following the Arab Spring were the very moment when the transition from legitimacy to a lack thereof occurred.
Such attacks carried out by the State mechanism were definitive of a disembellishment of the demos. Those acts of repression were prophesied decades earlier through the brutality which was epitomised in Hama. The people were no longer active participants in political representation; the autonomy to express internal legitimacy was stripped away from them through means of Realpolitik. In essence, the only sign of legitimacy that was to be demonstrated was external legitimacy, through the support of major world powers, such as Russia and China. The people had been objectified, subjects to be endowed with a heteronomous prevention from demonstrating their true political allegiances.
Social Coercion in the Assad Regime Post Hama:
"What the regime says is 180 degrees from the truth: they make a workers' union against the workers, a women's union against women, a Parliament against democracy .... No one believes the things they say, and everyone knows that no one believes them."[9]
The State mechanism of media and propaganda after Hama remained social coercion, no longer serving as social conviction. The ethos of the populace was bewildered after the brutal repressions following the outbreak of Hama, demonstrating what the State was capable of doing to all those who chose to oppose the status quo. As such, the civil society from the micro and macro paradigms adhered to their roles within the system, as cogs in a machine. This social coercion remained on the brink of collapse into open anarchy until it eventually did, following the Arab Spring in 2011. A decade of Civil War was to ravage one of the most ancient societies of humanity.
This decade, therefore, from the moment of the Civil War, which occurred from the Arab Spring, to the fleeing of Bashar Al Assad, was one of internal illegitimacy, veiled through political repression and external legitimacy endowed through arms, financing and lack of intervention.
The Future: Jolani and Islamism:
On the 8th December, 2024, Bashar Al Assad fled, leaving as his unwarranted successor, the well-renowned ‘Islamist’ Ahmed Al Shara’aa Al Jolani. Is Jolani legitimate according to the consent of the governed, through the paradigm of internal legitimacy? If he is and adheres to the Islamist agenda, can the regime be deemed as externally legitimate? If not, what becomes of the Syrian cause?
After analysing the character of Jolani, he seems to be an ambitious opportunist, stopping at no means to achieve his goals. With the unification of the rebel forces under the banner of HTS, which is still, at the point of writing, chaired by Jolani, there was an unprecedented new phase of legitimacy in Syria. This was codified through the promulgation of an interim government with Jolani as the interim president.
The national stirring around the transformation of regimes was epitomised through the ceremonious, almost messianic arrival of Jolani into the ancient mosque of Damascus, with the people cheering and welcoming him into the city. It cannot be doubted that Jolani has gained the favour of the Sunni majority within the territories of the Syrian State. From an anthropological paradigm, this is demonstrated through the hyper-repression of the majority populace for over 50 years by the State apparatus. It would only make sense for the civilians to rejoice in a leadership which aligns with their religious identity, which, for a demographic such as in Syria, forms a major factor of ideological unification. Jolani’s political revolution, from amassing small territories in Idlib for a decade to the entire State of Syria, marked the end of a period of civil war; the end of battle, and the acceptance of the regime change by the people who illustrated that they had found what they were looking for. Was this an Islamist ethos based upon the Muslim constitutionalism earlier advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood? Or perhaps an extremity, even according to this template, given the track record of HTS and its affiliations with renowned terrorist blocs such as Al Qaeda and ISIL?
It would seem that it is neither of the above. In considering the opportunistic leadership of Jolani, coupled with the trauma of the populace through a decade of civil war, what was to be advocated had to be streamlined into a State apparatus, translating into the civil service; from the micro to the macro paradigm of governance.
Therefore, based upon the definition of internal legitimacy as ‘communal adherence, derived from either social conviction or social duress, to the validity of an effective governing mechanism’, the HTS Regime attained the consent of the people. Whilst the metric point of proving the legitimacy of a regime transition is generally riddled with difficulties due to the multi-layered nuance of the particular scenario, this situation is different.
The fact of the relentless continuity of the Syrian civil war for over a decade, alongside the brutalisation of the majority by a totalitarian minority, both indicate that the war would not end unless the people were content with the replacement, lest all efforts fall into unending futility, in an ironic Animal Farm recollection.
Social Conviction in Post-Bashar Syria:
After the fall of the Ba'athist regime, arguably a new wave of legitimacy has emerged. This is accompanied by ideological and religious points of reference for the populace to bolster the social conviction of the regime. Where the Bathists required a political movement to enhance the support of the people, the current regime can utilise the religious identity of Sunnism to embellish its legitimacy through the dictates of populism.
Whether this is yet to transform into social coercion is yet to be established. However, it is unlikely to emerge as a totalitarian elitist governance, as reflected through its grassroots support. By utilising the concept of nationalism, from prioritising the Syrian population to making foreign deals to rebuild the economy, to ensuring rights for non-violent minority groups, Syria seems to be waking to an Arab Summer, leaving behind the cataclysmic political upheaval it has experienced.
Although the method of governance which it decides to pursue must be a decision which they pursue. There cannot be foreign intervention or coercion in mutating the will of the people; it must be organic and grassroots. The rapid change of events in this regime transformation, alongside its alignment with the will of the general populace, is promising in providing the mechanism of organic governance towards a true governance in the spirit of democratic values, even if it manifests based upon an Islamic constitutionalism.
As such, if Jolani’s governance is based upon an Islamic regime, gaining indisputable internal legitimacy, can Syria enter the World Stage once more (and by extension gain external legitimacy)?
Conclusion: Contradiction between the Theory and Practice:
The Syrian case study epitomises this issue with the overthrow of Bashar Al Assad by rebel factions, co-opting Ahmed Al Shara, most commonly known as ‘Al Jolani’, to form a replacement form of governance. If, in this new ideological promulgation, Jolani creates an ethos based upon a theocentric paradigm, by extension endorsing an ‘Islamist’ methodology of political legitimacy, will this be deemed as acceptable? Or will this act as a further demonstration of Huntington’s classical thesis point regarding The Clash Of Civilisations, from the Global Stage? A Clash which can only be resolved through eradication.
This is no longer a question of the imperial assumptions of the inadequacy of ‘the Other’ in governing its own affairs. Instead, it is a question as to how long this ideological ‘imperial overreach’ can last. If the French Mandate had not intervened in the first instance, would Syria have still been a breeding ground of terrorism and unprecedented internal destruction, or a thriving economy contributing to its neighbouring States? Whilst delving into regressive thought is often a futile endeavour, this juncture of State transformation must be a moment of reframing the relationship between the West and the Orient. Political autonomy must be grassroots for it to be sustainable, as the formulation of Failed States through foreign intervention demonstrates.
Therefore, the World Order must open its borders to a plurality of political ideologies of governance; the paradigm of universal democracy has collapsed, and the shrapnel of its reactions has led to a radicalism spreading across the world. The future of politics must be defined through internal legitimacy, depending upon the mechanism, makeup and contextual backdrop of that State, not what is expected of it by oblivious spectators.
Notes (Click number to return to text):
[1] This phrase was derived from The Arab Winter: A Tragedy, Noah Feldman.
[2] Kissinger, Henry, World Order (Penguin Press 2014).
[3] Hinnebusch, R. (2006). “Authoritarian Persistence, Democratization Theory and the Middle East: An Overview and Critique.” Democratization, 13(3), 373–395
[4] Beetham, D. (1991). The Legitimation of Power. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
[5] Kissinger, N2.
[6] Slaughter, Anne-Marie A New World Order (Princeton University Press 2004).
[7] Ibid.
[8] Perthes, Volker (1995). The Political Economy of Syria under Asad. I.B. Tauris.
[9] (Independent Member of Syrian Parliament) Ambiguities of domination, Lisa Wedeen.
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Kissinger, Henry, World Order (Penguin Press 2014).
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A very good read